Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Private language: according to L. Wittgenstein a private language, i.e. a language which an individual develops only for himself and uses to express his feelings, is not possible. (See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, § 243, 258). You cannot give yourself instructions. You could not even understand the language. See also rule following, Kripke's Wittgenstein, priviledged access, Wittgenstein's beetle._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John McDowell on Private Language - Dictionary of Arguments
I 43 Private Language/Wittgenstein: Vs view that "there are simply objects that language cannot grasp at all" - "could language capture them, they were within the conceptual sphere and could thus not exercise any control". >Private language/Wittgenstein. I 43/44 Wittgenstein: (according to McDowell): with such terms it would then be a private language. (Which is not possible according to Wittgenstein). Wittgenstein's "private abstraction" of a manifold, which could then only be achieved by "private ostension", which is, according to Wittgenstein, impossible or meaningless. McDowell: with "private terms", spontaneity does not reach as far as the term. >Concept/McDowell, >Spontaneity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, |
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> Counter arguments against McDowell
> Counter arguments in relation to Private Language
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28